INTRODUCTION
Should the Japanese yen be depreciated to revive the Japanese economy? Since the bursting of the stock-and land-market bubbles in 1990-91, the Japanese economy has fallen into its deepest postwar recession. Because fiscal policy and monetary policy are at their limits in combating recession and deflation, a possible foreign exchange policy "solution" has gained wide attention.
For instance, McCallum (2000) proposes to stimulate Japanese output through unsterilized foreign exchange intervention. Meltzer (1999) states that yen devaluation by unsterilized foreign currency purchases would restore Japan's competitive position in the world economy and thus support a sustained recovery. Svensson (2000) presumes to have found a "foolproof way of escaping from the liquidity trap" by combining an inflation target with a real yen depreciation. The IMF (2001: 33-34) has urged the Bank of Japan "to use all instruments at its disposal to combat deflation", i.e., to further expand money supply and to depreciate the yen.
In late 2002 several Japanese officials-hoping that a weaker yen would boost the country's ailing economy-stepped up efforts to talk the yen lower. The financial services minister Takenaka expressed its desire for a weaker yen. Similarly, the finance Minister Shiokawa has repeatedly stated that the yen is overvalued. However, Okina (1999: 179) from the Bank of Japan rejects the demands for a weaker yen. Large scale purchases of foreign currency by the Japanese authorities with the aim of depreciating the yen could provoke opposition from its major trading partners and be criticized as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Japan's small East Asian neighbour countries vehemently oppose a weaker yen (The Economist 2002) .
The proponents of a significant yen depreciation doubt that it would hurt Japan's smaller neighbouring economies. Bernanke (2000: 161) argues that the beggar-thyneighbour argument against competitive devaluation had its origins in the Great Depression and does not apply to contemporary Japan and East Asia. According to Meltzer (1999: 189-190 ) a yen devaluation has no strong negative impacts on Japan's trading partners, particularly if the positive impact of a Japanese recovery is counted: "In my view -and supported by the experience of the past decade -devaluation would be a cheaper, and I believe, faster way to restore prosperity to Japan and its neighbours." Svensson (2000) and the IMF (2000 IMF ( : 28-30, 2001 assume that the negative effect which a yen depreciation might cause in East Asia's smaller countries would be more than offset by more Japanese imports from the region. In an IMF working paper Callen and McKibbin (2001) apply a macroeconomic G-cubed Asia-Pacific model with international trade and capital flows to explore how yen depreciation affects the smaller East Asian economies. They contend that Japanese monetary expansion coupled with yen depreciation would have "minimal" effects (p. 35) on the rest of Asia.
In this paper, however, we contend that the opposite is true. Updating a model pioneered by C.H. Kwan, we show that the current and lagged effects of a yen depreciation on output in the smaller East Asian economies ha ve been strongly negative.
Within plausible ranges of income growth in Japan or movements in the yen/dollar exchange rate, the positive impulse of more regional imports from Japan should Japanese income growth increase is swamped by the negative effect of substantial yen depreciation. Indeed, for the past two decades, fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate have generated a synchronized business cycle in the smaller East Asian economies. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 year real growth in percent Hong Kong Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Taiwan third markets such as the United States and Japan. Second, they followed similar exchange rate, monetary, and fiscal policies. Third, the EA 1 countries were and are directly or indirectly affected by exogenous fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate, our primary focus in this paper.
GROWING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND
International trade has been the driving force behind the "miracle" growth with rapid industrialization. Initially, the East Asian economies relied heavily on exports to, and imports from, the United States, Japan, and other industrial countries. In the last two decades, however, intra-East Asian trade became relatively more important (Urata, 2001 Theoretically, rising trade between two countries can result in greater or weaker synchronization of aggregate demand fluctuations (Frankel and Rose, 1998) . If two countries engage in Heckscher-Ohlin or Ricardian type trade, they become more specialized in certain economic sectors or industries. Thus their business cycles tend to be more idiosyncratic. As trade in dissimilar products between two countries increases, with one country specializing in the production of, say, cars and the other specializing in the production of palm oil, both countries will react differently to industry-specific exogenous shocks. Business cycles will differ. Suppose, however, intra-industry trade predominates as in electrical equipment and semiconductors. Because one country both imports from, and exports this equipment to the other, exogenous shocks will affect both in the same way. Business cycles will be synchronous. A sudden decline in the demand for computers would slow economic growth in both countries.
Because both types of trade patterns can be observed, the impact of strengthened trade linkages on the common business cycle is ambiguous. First, the "newly" industria lized club of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan-of which China is an increasingly important member-have highly developed and capital-intensive industries where intra-industry trade could be important. Second, the ASEAN core countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand focus more on agricultural products, raw materials, and labour-intensive products, where intra-industry trade is less important. Between the two groups (horizontal) inter-industry trade as well as (vertical) intra-industry trade within the East Asian production system are possible.
The upshot is that industry-specific random shocks are unlikely to generate the highly synchronized business cycles shown in Figure 1 . Instead we must look for macroeconomic shocks that affect aggregate demand and broad industrial competitiveness across the board in East Asia outside of Japan. Whence our focus on fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate.
FLUCTUATIONS IN THE YEN/DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE: THE LOOSE CANNON
Central to our argument is the fact that all East Asian countries, except Japan itself, tend to stabilize their exchange rate against the US dollar in non crisis periods. Before 2,60 1 9 7 1 . 0 1 1 9 7 3 . 0 1 1 9 7 5 . 0 1 1 9 7 7 . 0 1 1 9 7 9 . 0 1 1 9 8 1 . 0 1 1 9 8 3 . 0 1 1 9 8 5 . 0 1 1 9 8 7 . 0 1 1 9 8 9 . 0 1 1 9 9 1 . 0 1 1 9 9 3 . 0 1 1 9 9 5 . 0 1 1 9 9 7 . 0 1 1 9 9 9 . 0 1 2 0 0 1 . By keeping their exchange rates stable against the dollar, the smaller East Asian economies must cope with extraneous fluctuations of the dollar against the yen.
To illustrate the magnitude of this problem over the past decade, Figure 3 shows the large fluctuations of the yen against the Hong Kong dollar-which remained firmly pegged to the US dollar since the early 1980s. The upper panels in Figure 3 show the gradual swings of the absolute Hong Kong dollar exchange rate against US dollar and yen, the lower panels show the monthly percentage exchange rate fluctuations.
Clearly in both terms-gradual absolute swings and relative changes-the yen/dollar exchange rate is a volatile outlier for Hong Kong in specific and the East Asian exchange rate system as a whole. This imbalance has important consequences. The yen/dollar exchange rate affects collective EA 1 output in two ways: trade and foreign direct investment (Kwan, 2001 ). The first is a real exchange rate or interna-tional competitiveness effect. Yen/dollar fluctuations impact Japan's international competitiveness both against the United States and against all the other East Asian countries-which peg to the dollar. While yen appreciation stimulates EA 1 exports to Japan and to the rest of the world, yen depreciation impairs the international competitiveness of the EA 1 economies. When the yen depreciates, EA 1 imports and competition from Japanese goods increase while their exports decline. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 year exports (change rate in percent)
exchange rate (change rate in percent) exports yen/dollar Source: IMF: IFS. Note: EA 1 exports only excluding China and Japan.
The second transmission channel is Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the rest of East Asia. FDI is highly correlated with the yen/dollar excha nge rate. FDI accelerates when the yen appreciates ( Figure 5 ) because production and investment in Japan itself becomes relatively more expensive. When the yen is high and appreciating, the influx of Japanese long-term capital and know-how boosts domestic gross fixed investment in EA 1 and stimulates output-and vice versa when the yen is low.
The exchange-driven nature of Japanese FDI was particularly pronounced in the early 1990s. When the yen rose from 145 per dollar in 1990 to less than 80 per dollar in 1995, Japanese FDI to EA 1 increased fast ( Figure 5 ). Japanese multinationals and even small and medium enterprises shifted unprofitable (parts of) the production process to the low-wage and generally lower-cost East Asian countries. In Japan, this ratio nalization process was perceived as hollowing out (kûdôka) of the Japanese economy, while it provided an additional growth stimulus to its small neighbours. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 year change rate of FDI (percent) Thus, the more internal financing (wealth) a firm can bring into a FDI project, the lower will be the total costs. An appreciation of the domestic currency increases the relative net worth of the domestic enterprise for investing abroad, and the domestic investor can bid more aggressively for foreign assets. The FDI out of the home country increases. External financing is assumed to be more expensive than internal financing because external creditors face higher costs to observe profits. While the domestic enterprise knows the profit of an FDI project, the outside creditor faces higher costs to acquire the information about the "true" return.
-6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 year real growth (percent) yearly data because qua rterly data on real GDP are not available for most East Asia n countries for the whole observation period. All regressions are run with yearly rates of change (first differences) to avoid problems caused by nonstationarity. 5 As Kwan found, Table 3 shows a strong inverse correlation between the yen/dollar exchange rate and growth in EA 2 . For every one percent increase in the yen/dollar rate both current and lagged one year, real growth in EA 2 falls about 0.17 per cent 6 .
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The EA1 real growth rate (yEA1) is calculated as weighted average of the real growth rates of eight (k = 8) smaller East Asian countries by the formula:
Yi is the nominal GDP of country i in terms of dollar and yi is the real GDP growth rate of country i.
5
For most countries the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Yet we view this acceptance as due to the low power of the test for our very short sample period. 6 The coefficients of the current and previous periods are added to get a long-run exchange rate multiplier, which is more fully explained below. The estimations are performed in three steps. In step one, we estimate only the interactive output effects in East Asia from which exchange rate effects are excluded.
The impact of changes in output in the US, China, Japan and REA1 j (the EA 1 countries other than the jth one being considered) on output of the single East Asian country j is estimated. In step two, we estimate the impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate on output in the East Asia countries collectively and individually-both including and excluding the crisis years of 1997-98. In step three, we draw conclusions from the combined interpretation of step one and step two.
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In reality Japanese growth is not exogenous, but strongly dependent on EA1 growth. But because the main goal of this paper to describe the EA1 business cycle, we treat Japanese growth as exogenous.
a. Measuring Output Fluctuations
In step one, we show how output fluctuations in the large countries-Japan, China, and the United States-influence output in the smaller East Asian economies. Let y Japan , y China , y US and y REA1j be annual growth in real output in Japan, China, the United States, and the rest of EA 1 (EA 1 except country j which is the dependent variable) respectively. We then regress the economic growth of country j on these variables. We don't use any lagged exogenous variables as they did not yield any significant results in previous tests. Thus the tested equation is: 
Because economic growth in Japan and REA1 j are interdependent, the assumption of independence between the exogenous variables is violated. To cope with this multicollinearity problem we estimate a first regression with Japan as exogeneous variable leaving REA1 j out. In a second regression we drop Japan using REA1 j as exogenous variable.
The regression results are reported in Table 4 Secondly, as depicted in Figure 1 , the evidence for a common business cycle in the small East Asian economies is strong-as reflected by the β 5 coefficients for REA1 j in equation 2. For all the EA 1 countries except Singapore and Taiwan shown in Table 4 , the β 5 coefficients are significant. This coefficient is significant at the 1% level for six countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) and at the 5% level for Taiwan. The Philippines' coefficient is significant at the 10%-level.
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Although not captured in our sample excluding country j. TStatistics in Parentheses. * significant at the 10% level. ** significant at the 5% level. *** significant at the 1% level.
Third, Japan has a important role for the business cycle of its smaller neighbouring countries. Japanese output changes have a significant impact on five out of eight East Asian countries-Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Malaysia is close to significance at the ten 10% level. Only the business cycles of the Philippines and Singapore seem not to be linked to Japan's. For EA 1 as a whole, the impact of the Japan's business cycle is significant at the 5% level. For EA 2 the impact of the Japan's business cycle is significant at the 10% level. 
b. Measuring Exchange Rate Effects
Despite the positive correlation of East Asian and Japanese output, their business cycles are far from being totally synchronized. Because of the asymmetric impact of changes in the yen/dollar exchange rate, Japanese and East Asian business cycles could diverge. The impact of a higher yen is to depress growth in Japan while stimulating it in the rest of East Asia. A weaker yen stimulates the Japanese economy while depressing growth in the smaller East Asian countries.
In step one, we measured interactive output effects while ignoring the exchange rate. Now in step two, we measure just the concurrent and lagged effect of the exchange rate on output in each of the East Asian countries. Concurrently, i.e., within the year corresponding to our annual observations, changes in the yen/dollar rate affect the competitiveness of exports (Figure 4 ). But also with a lag, there might be some impact via exports and foreign direct investment.
After regressing different lag lengths of the yen/dollar exchange rate on annual output changes for every East Asian country, lags of two periods or longer become insignificant. Therefore regression equation 3 uses a maximum lag of just one year. 
In equation 3, again there is the problem of multicollinearity where successive time series data on the yen/dollar exchange rate tend to be correlated. For any one estimated coefficient, its standard error is "too" large leading to an underestimation of its true t-value. However, the coefficients associated with each lag are still unb iased and efficient, and the overall fit of the model is adequately reflected in the R 2 and Fstatistics. To measure the cumulative or long-run effect of a change in the yen/dollar rate, we can simply sum the two coefficients for the zero and one-year lag.
The results of so estimating equation 3 are reported in Table 5 . The negative impact of the ye n/dollar exchange rate on the output in the EA 1 and EA 2 is strong, both significant at the 5% level. On the individual country level changes of the yen/dollar exchange rate most strongly affect the Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) and Thailand, which directly compete with Japanese enterprises in EA 2 , in Japan, and in third markets. The coefficients of Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan are significant at the 5% or 10% level in the same period. The long-run coefficients-adding the impact of the concurrent and lagged period-of -0.29 for Hong Kong, -0.27 for Korea, -.20 for Taiwan, and -0.33 for Tha iland are all significant at the 1% level. Taken at face value, these are big numbers. For example, a one percent depreciation of the yen against the dollar would slow Thai growth by almost one third of one percent.
In contrast, the coefficients for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singaporehave the expected sign without being significant. However, the fact that a depreciation of the yen against the dollar affects them all (slightly) negatively means that the "tstatistic" for any one equation likely understates its true significance.
Although China's own long-run exchange multiplier is "almost" significant, its net stabilizing influence on the other East Asian countries is better shown by comparing the highly significant regression coefficients for EA 1 and EA 2 . Table 5 shows that the long-run multiplier for a change in the yen/dollar rate on the smaller East Asian economies collectively is -0.21-but drops to -0.17 when China is included. China is much less affected by changes in the yen/dollar rate than are the others. Table 4 , the crisis years 1997/98 are excluded from the estimation. Table 6 reports the results of excluding observations from 1997 and 1998. The impact of the yen/dollar exchange rate on EA 1 and EA 2 remains strong and invariant (as in Table 5 ) to leaving out the crisis years. The long-run multipliers are significant for the region as a whole at the five percent level for EA 1 and one percent level for EA 2 .
At the individual country level in Table 6 , the output growth in the NIEs Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan is affected still strongly by yen/dollar exchange rate fluctuations. The coefficients of Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan are all significant. The long-run multipliers for these three countries are large.
The ASEAN core countries Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines are not as strongly affected and the coefficients are insignificant. While for Thailand the coefficient remains high, it becomes insignificant in contrast to the overall sample reported in Table 5 . Table 6 also underlines the special position of China and Singapore which were not very strongly affected by the yen/dollar fluctuations. Overall, Table 5 and Table 6 strongly support our view that the common EA 1 business cycle is generated largely by fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate.
However, this is not to deny that the frenzy of overborrowing in foreign currencies from 1994 to 1996 was an important factor contributing to the crash of 1997-98. But this seems (at least one hopes!) to be a "one-time" event. Nevertheless, the depreciation of the yen over 1996-98 definitely made the downturn worse. More generally, fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate seem to be a continual (rather than a "one off") source of disturbance generating cyclical fluctuations in the East Asian economy. -0.17*** (-3.14) Note: The dependent variable is annual output growth. Data source: IMF: IFS, Central Bank of China. LRM = long-run exchange rate multiplier. T-Statistics in Parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
d. Combining Output and Exchange Rate Effects
In steps one and two, interactive output effects (Table 4 ) and exchange rate effects (Table 5) were estimated. We observed that the NIEs Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan are strongly affected by fluctuations of the yen/dollar exchange rate, while for the ASEAN core countries this effect is much weaker. Nevertheless, the impact on the smaller East Asian countries as a group (EA 1 ) is strong. How can the strong impact on EA 1 be explained?
The answer lies within the pattern of East Asian division of labour. Within the East Asian production chain, the ASEAN core countries have presumed the role of subcontractors or suppliers for the industrially more developed NIEs-Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan (Urata, 2001 ). This intra-Asian pattern of division of labour contributes to the synchronized business cycle. If the yen/dollar rate changes, the NIEs are more directly affected than are the ASEAN core countries. But, the ASEAN core countries are still affected indirectly by intra-East Asian income effects.
e. The relative shrinkage in Japan's economy As shown in Table 2 First, the fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate not only affect trade with Japan but also affect the competitiveness of EA 2 exports in third markets. As the yen depreciates, the exports of Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and perhaps eventually China, lose competitiveness against Japanese competitors in the US and Europe. However, as shown in Table 2 , the US and ROW still make up 50 per cent of EA 1 exports and 40 per cent of EA 1 imports. This suggests that the se third market effects account for a crucial part of the impact of the yen/dollar rate on East Asia. Against this effect ho wever, is the relative shrinkage of Japan as a supplier into third markets if Japan's economic malaise were to continue.
Second, although the Japanese economy may continue its relative decline, the leverage effect of fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate on the rest of East Asia could still increase. Table 1 shows the remarkably increasing economic integration of the smaller East Asian countries with each other. Thus a common external disturbance, i.e., a change in the yen/dollar rate, has an increasing impact on their common bus iness cycle as they become more integrated. To some (unknown) degree, this leverage effect could well offset (into the indefinite future) continual relative shrinkage in the size of Japan's economy. As long as the yen/dollar rate fluctuates, we don't expect the synchronized East Asian business cycle to disappear any time soon.
f. Japan's Interaction with the Smaller East Asian Economies: A Summary
To summarize the main sources of instability in the East Asian economy, Table 7 is a taxonomy of the macroeconomic impact of events in the Japanese economychanges in the yen/dollar rate and Japan's business cycle-on the income of EA 1 .
There are four possible combinations of changes in the yen/dollar rate and upswings or downswings in Japanese income. The plus signs in the body of the table indicate an expansionary effect on EA1-with minus signs indicating contraction. Upswing in Japan Downswing in Japan Yen appreciation j + / + l -/ + Yen depreciation k -/ + m -/ -+ indicates a positive impact on y EA1 , and a -indicates a negative impact on y EA1 . Case • is the best outcome for EA 1 countries. The yen appreciates against the dollar while the Japanese economy is expanding. The positive income effect and exchange rate effect reinforce each other to stimulate aggregate output. But discrete episodes are difficult to identify in the data.
Case " is the worst outcome for the EA 1 countries. Yen depreciation is aggravated by an economic downswing in Japan. This case was observed during the Asian crisis of 1997-98 when Japanese income turned down as the yen fell.
Case ‚ applied in 1986-87 and again in the early 1990s up to 1995. In each episode, the strong yen was accompanied by a recession in Japan, what was widely characterised as "high-yen induced recession" (endaka fukyô). While the recessions had a negative effect on the EA 1 economies, the yen appreciations boosted growth-with this exchange rate effect predominating. The EA 1 economies experienced high growth in both cases.
Case ƒ seems to apply from mid 1995 through 1996. Japan's output increased as the yen declined. The initial net affect on EA 1 was positive. But eventually the falling yen-which bottomed out at 147 to the dollar in June 1998-helped provoke the great Asian crisis, putting us back into Case ".
Again we learn that the exchange rate effect usually dominates the income effectan important empirical regularity to keep in mind when we discuss whether a deep devaluation of the yen would permit Japan to export its way out of its current slump.
CONCLUSION
Our message is clear: the yen should not be deprecia ted below some rough measure of purchasing power parity (PPP)-as per the current rate of about 120 yen per dollarto "boost" the Japanese economy. More generally, ongoing fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate around PPP increase the volatility of the business cycle in the smaller East Asian economies. They would be much better off if the yen was permanently tethered.
Other economists have recognized how fluctuations in the yen/dollar rate destabilize economies in the ever-more-integrated East Asia region. But their common policy "solution" is to give the yen more weight in the exchange rate baskets of the nine EA 2 countries (Williamson, 2000; Kwan, 2001 ). However, this proposed solution is misplaced. Why change the monetary and exchange rate policies of nine East Asian countries-including big ones like China and Korea-whose revealed preferences are to peg to the dollar (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2002) , when changing just Japan's would be sufficient?
Putting the matter more positively for Japan itself, Goyal and McKinnon (2003) show that the fluctuating yen has been a prime cause of Japan's low-interest rate liquidity trap and its failure to escape from the ongoing slump. Thus, stabilizing the yen/dollar rate in nominal terms indefinitely would benefit Japan on the one hand and its East Asian neighbours on the other. But for any such exchange rate agreement to be credible would require the cooperation of the United States-specifically through joint action by the US Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of Japan Ohno, 1997, 2001) . But that is a story for another time.
